# CIVIL FUNCTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, APPROPRIATIONS, 1953

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to call, in room F–39, the Capitol, Hon. Kenneth McKellar (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McKellar, Ellender, McClellan, and Stennis.

Also present: Senator Butler.

## CORPS OF ENGINEERS

### MISSOURI RIVER FLOOD OF 1952

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. LEWIS A. PICK, CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, ACCOMPANIED BY BRIG. GEN. C. H. CHORPENING, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF ENGINEERS FOR CIVIL WORKS; COL. WRIGHT HIATT, DEPUTY CHIEF OF CIVIL WORKS FOR FLOOD CONTROL; F. A. BRADLEY, CHIEF, BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING DIVISION; HARRY COHEN, CHIEF, FLOOD CONTROL SECTION; G. L. BEARD, CHIEF, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT DIVISION; B. J. TOFANI, CHIEF, PROJECT PROGRAMS BRANCH; A. J. SMET, CHIEF, RIVERS AND HARBORS PROJECT SECTION; LT. COL. E. C. PAULES, DEPUTY CHIEF, CIVIL WORKS FOR POWER; COL. W. D. MILNE, DEPUTY CHIEF FOR RIVERS AND HARBORS; STUART H. D. FREED, BUDGET ANALYST, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; AND H. V. DARLING, MISSISSIPPI RIVER COMMISSION**

Chairman MCKELLAR. The committee will come to order, and we will hear from General Pick.

General, you have no objection to Senator Butler's making a statement for the record before you proceed?

General PICK. No, sir.

Chairman MCKELLAR. Go right ahead, Senator.

**STATEMENT OF HON. HUGH BUTLER, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA**

PREPARED STATEMENT

Senator BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I have here a copy of a statement that I made on the floor following my return from spending a week on the Missouri River after the recent flood.

Chairman McKellar. Yes, sir; I heard the statement. It is a good statement. I am glad you are putting it in the record. I think it would be perfectly fitting to have it in the record now.

Senator Butler. I want to endorse everything that the General will have to say about these charts because I heard his presentation out there when he made it to the President; and it is well worth hearing and seeing.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

[From Congressional Record, Senate, April 22, 1952]

THE MISSOURI RIVER FLOOD AND THE FLOOD-CONTROL PLAN

Mr. Butler of Nebraska. Mr. President, perhaps we can make a little progress on the pending measure if I speak on another subject while the members of the Committee on Appropriations try to get together on the proposed amendment.

Yesterday I returned from a front-row observation post of the greatest Missouri River flood ever seen by white men. The masterly direction of the saving of Omaha and Council Bluffs from peak flow inundation by Lt. Gen. Lewis A. Pick, Chief of the Army Engineers, and his associates, the splendid relief corps organized by the Red Cross throughout the disaster area, the superhuman efforts of volunteers—all will be remembered throughout the six affected States as an outstanding example of the spirit of America.

At the height of the effort, as many as 15,000 men—all unpaid volunteers—were manning the 23 miles of dikes in the vicinity of Omaha and Council Bluffs. Volunteers came from as far as 100 to 150 miles away. College students came from all over Nebraska and Iowa to help. The use of many hundreds of trucks was donated by business firms free of charge. At one point I saw a hundred women helping, holding the sandbags while the men shoveled in the sand. That picture sticks in my mind as a typical example of the spirit of the people in mobilizing to meet this danger. I want to pay tribute to that spirit. It thrilled me, as I am sure it thrilled television audiences, and those who followed the daily development of the crisis through press and radio reports.

The damages wrought by the uncontrolled volumes of water bring forcibly to us the need for vigorous prosecution of the remedial works which have been planned carefully in great detail for some time. In addition to Fort Peck Dam, five others are in various stages of construction by the Corps of Engineers in the Dakotas. Of the six, four will create great storage reservoirs. Fort Peck, Garrison, Oahe, and Fort Randall Reservoirs will together provide 13,750,000 acre-feet of flood storage, about twice the volume of the present flood flow. But, had either Garrison or Oahe been in operation prior to the flood, the overflows would have caused relatively little damage. Present estimates of the damages exceed $350,000,000. About 2,000,000 acres of farm lands were inundated. About 100,000 people were compelled to leave their homes.

This is an appropriate time to review in general terms this main-stem reservoir system, a part of the program popularly known as the Pick-Sloan plan. Fort Peck Dam is completed. One hundred and forty million dollars is required to complete Garrison Dam and its appurtenant facilities. Eighty million dollars is required to complete the Fort Randall project. These sums aggregate less than the damages of this single flood. This system of dams cannot operate as independent units because the plan embraces a comprehensive system of reservoirs, levees, and channel improvement for flood control, hydroelectric power development, navigation, irrigation and related beneficial uses of water. With respect to the flood-control features of the plan, primary control of the Missouri River would be afforded by the four main-stem storage reservoirs extending 1,000 miles from Fort Peck Dam to Fort Randall Dam. The two other storage dams in between Fort Peck and Fort Randall are Garrison and Oahe. Two small dams, Big Bend below Oahe and Gavins Point below Fort Randall, are also included to permit the most effective operation of the main storage projects. The total storage provided behind the six main-stem dams is in excess of 73,-

000,000 acre-feet, and the reservoir system will control the runoff from 263,000 square miles, the upper half of the drainage basin of the entire Missouri River. Levees planned along the banks of the Missouri River below Sioux City will control the flows discharged from the storage dams in addition to side inflows coming from the tributaries between Sioux City and the mouth. The amount of storage contemplated in the four main storage reservoirs and the breakdown between flood-control storage, conservation storage, and silt storage are shown in the following table:

| Reservoir | Storage in acre-feet | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Flood control | Conservation | Inactive silt | |
| Fort Peck | 3,500,000 | 11,400,000 | 4,500,000 | 19,400,000 |
| Garrison | 4,250,000 | 13,850,000 | 4,900,000 | 23,000,000 |
| Oahe | 3,500,000 | 14,600,000 | 5,500,000 | 23,600,000 |
| Fort Randall | 2,500,000 | 2,400,000 | 1,400,000 | 6,300,000 |
| Total | 13,750,000 | 42,250,000 | 16,300,000 | 72,300,000 |

The silt storage shown in the table is needed to assure against the encroachment of sediment on the storage allocated to flood control and conservation. The largest silt carrier in the Missouri Basin is the Yellowstone River, which enters the Missouri River at the head of Garrison Reservoir. In that reservoir the storage allocated to silt will take care of the Yellowstone sediment load for more than 100 years. At Oahe Reservoir, more than 100 years of silt inflow from the Cheyenne River and other tributaries, which produce the second largest contribution in the basin, can be accommodated without encroachment upon storage allocated to other purposes.

After completion, the reservoirs will be operated so that from March to June of each year, which is the flood period in the upper basin, floodwaters will be caught and stored in each reservoir in the space reserved for flood control and conservation. After the flood season is over, the big question for Lt. Gen. Lewis A. Pick, whose engineers will operate the reservoir system, is how to return down the river the stored floodwaters. He must release all water accumulated in capacities reserved for flood control before the next spring flood season; but the water that he releases must also be gainfully used for irrigation, navigation, power, etc. Most important, he must regulate the releases from Fort Randall, the lowermost reservoir, so that they will not add damagingly to the flood runoff from the 200,000-square-mile uncontrolled drainage area between that point and the mouth of the Missouri River.

I gathered much information from the men in the Corps of Engineers during this flood, as you may have noted. But let me submit a few more details, because, as I stated, there is urgency to proceed with all the units in the plan, as I shall demonstrate.

The need for the Gavins Point and Big Ben Reservoirs in the upper Missouri system is a result of a careful analysis of engineering and economic requirements. Without these reservoirs, the value of the main storage system would be considerably reduced. For example, Gavins Point Dam will not be a storage reservoir in the same sense as the four up-river reservoirs, because it will create only a 45-foot head and will have a capacity of only 525,000 acre-feet. However, it assures fully flexible operation of the Fort Randall project and is vitally needed as an integral part of that project. The reason for this is that the total volume of water released during the winter season from Fort Randall Dam must be limited in order to conserve water for future release during the following summer's navigation season and also because of the ice hazard. In order to use the available water to the best advantage, the Fort Randall power plant will be operated on peak load; that is, the power plant will pass large releases for 3 or 4 hours a day, and then will be practically shut down for the remainder of the day. These daily fluctuations will range from 2,500 cubic feet per second to 40,000 cubic feet per second; and if these abrupt changes were allowed to pass down the river, the ice cover of 2 or 3 feet which forms each year would be converted into ice to be stored within the river banks. When added to the already large volumes of flow now released by the natural break-up of ice each spring, the additional ice storage resulting from the discharge fluctuations from Fort Randall would cause serious flooding. Therefore, the Gavins Point Dam is needed to reregulate the discharges from Fort Randall so that they can be re-

leased at a uniform rate downstream under the ice cover. Gavins Point Dam is also needed to eliminate the fluctuations during the summer season. If these fluctuations were permitted, there would be serious attack on the river banks through erosion, which is accentuated by rising and falling river stages. Gavins Point Dam will permit the passage of a steady flow and will prevent abrupt changes which would cause severe erosion.

The importance of simultaneous completion of all the reservoirs of the system is emphasized by examination of the problems associated with the system of operation for flood control and by the necessity of integrated coordination of the individual reservoir and dam units. Oahe Dam was the last project of the system to get under way, and at an optimum rate of appropriation it will lag completion of Garrison and Fort Randall Dams by 4 or 5 years.

The three main-stem reservoirs and the two small dams which were added by the 1944 Flood Control Act, and which are vitally needed to prevent floods such as the present one, could all have been completed in a period of from 5 to 7 years, depending upon the rate of appropriation. If appropriations for construction had been made immediately after authorization in 1944 and if continuing appropriations had been made to permit the work to be carried on to the maximum practicable extent, the entire main-control system would now have been in operation and the present damages would have been prevented. As it stands now, if major construction appropriations are made in the next 5 or 6 years, Oahe, the last of the reservoirs, still will not be completed until 1958. This represents a gap of 14 years between authorization and completion of the main storage elements.

It is too late now to turn back the pages and have these projects in operation. Fortunately, the closure of Fort Randall this summer will provide a substantial amount of flood control, to be increased later as Garrison and, finally, Oahe are placed in operation. In view of the urgent need for these projects, as demonstrated by the present flood, it is imperative that no further delay be permitted in an orderly and efficient construction program.

The large demand for power in the agricultural areas of the Missouri Basin and the delay in the completion of the Fort Randall project, together are bringing about a condition of uncertainty in the power situation. When the Congress approves an appropriation for the commencement of a power plant as important as Fort Randall, it should go through with the program without delay. Once construction has started, the intelligent thing is to complete it as quickly as possible, so that we may begin to realize the benefits at the earliest possible date. The Bureau of Reclamation is the Federal marketing agency for all power to be produced at these Federal hydropower plants. The Bureau cannot make commitments unless there is a dependable construction schedule. I am not complaining about what has been done. The general plan for the basin was authorized in December 1944, and at that time we still had to win World War II; but detailed plans had to be prepared. Labor and materials were scarce. Then came the Korean action. Again, labor and materials had to be allotted to meet national requirements for keeping the peace. We are now in a phase which may maintain its emergency aspects for years. Meanwhile, let us get flood protection for large critical areas, and let us supply electric power to meet all legitimate needs.

Mr. President, it is time to stop hemming and hawing about the flood-control problem in the Missouri Basin, and to push this flood-control program through to completion at the earliest possible moment. The floods and the dangers we have experienced during the past few weeks could have been prevented and should have been prevented. They can be prevented in the future if we will complete these dams—now. The people of the Missouri Basin understand and realize that fact. They know that they need not suffer another such catastrophe. They know it can be prevented, and they are not disposed to sit patiently and wait until an even greater calamity spurs us to action.

I believe the House of Representatives made a serious mistake in reducing proposed appropriations for the Missouri Basin, particularly in the sharp reduction for Oahe and in rejecting the appropriation for Gavins Point. This system of dams must be considered as a unit and built as a unit. Postponement of Gavins Point will make it impossible to operate Fort Randall effectively. Delay in completing Oahe will destroy much of the effectiveness of the entire system.

I intend to urge these considerations strongly to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Civil Functions. I am for a balanced budget. I have opposed and shall continue to oppose Federal spending which is unnecessary or which is

beyond our financial capacity, but control of destructive floods is a program which clearly should have priority over the great majority of other Federal programs, particularly those involving American assistance to foreign countries. I believe it is time to recognize that our first obligation is to our own people.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point an editorial from the Omaha World-Herald of April 21.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

"THE VALOR AND DEVOTION

"To give individual citations for gallantry in the battle against the Missouri River would be a total impossibility. The heroes have been legion, the time and strength they have given to the fight incalcuable, the valor and devotion they have displayed beyond reward.

"In this note of appreciation, however, a few organizations should be mentioned.

"The Army engineers have been truly magnificient. Their knowledge of the river and its monstrous, treacherous ways provided the solid base from which the battle to save Omaha and Council Bluffs was waged.

"The Civil Defense Organization was splendid. It sprang to its duties as if it had been trained and rehearsed for years to face just such a crisis.

"The local authorities on both sides of the river—sheriff's staff, police, firemen and elected officials—handled their respective tasks most competently. The armed services—Army, Air Force, National Guard, and Coast Guard—mobilized their forces with the utmost speed and efficiency and threw them into the battle.

"In providing for displaced families, and in ministering to the workers, the Red Cross and the Salvation Army and the Volunteers of America were superb.

"In providing equipment for the fight and supplies for the fighters, countless firms and industries gave without stint.

"But those many fine organizations provided only the skeleton of the army of defense. Their ranks were filled and made solid and given real fighting muscle by the thousands of volunteers who thronged to the levees and for long, sleepless, restless hours did the back-breaking labor which in truth saved the cities from the river.

"Many of them came from other Iowa and Nebraska cities or from distant States. Others came down from their own homes, snug and dry in the hills above the angry waters, to slosh through the rain and mud in the mighty counter-attack which finally saved the homes of their neighbors.

"Here were people at their shining best. Here was revelation, one which those who witnessed it will never forget, of the good will and good neighborliness which lie in the human heart.

"Speaking, we feel sure, for every resident of the community, this newspaper humbly and gratefully extends thanks to the thousands who without thought of glory or pay took part in the valiant battle. The sums which are pouring in to the World-Herald Flood Relief Fund for the Red Cross are, we think, more than a contribution to a good organization. They are also a testimonial to the heroism of an army of men and women who faced the roaring challenge of the Missouri's mightiest flood, and turned it back."

## Upper Missouri River Basin

### SOURCE OF FLOODWATERS

Chairman McKellar. All right, General, we are at your service. Go ahead.

General Pick. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, as you know, we have just had another unprecedented flood in the Missouri River Basin. The flood this time came from the upper Missouri Basin.

You will recall that last year we had an unprecedented flood in the lower Missouri Basin which came out of the lower part of the basin, out of the Kansas River watershed.

Mr. Chairman, on this chart, I have shown the outline of the drainage area of the Missouri Basin. It is indicated by this black line.

That indicates the drainage area which is drained by the Missouri River. We refer to the portion of the Missouri River from Kansas City upstream, as the "upper river" and to the portion from Kansas City downstream as the "lower river."

As you know, Congress, in 1944, authorized a comprehensive plan for multiple-purpose development in the Missouri Basin. That is a great water-conservation plan which takes into consideration flood control, navigation, irrigation, the development of power, recreation, fish and wildlife, and other activities which the local people in the Missouri Basin are all committed to and which they are cooperating in carrying out, cooperating with the Federal Government.

On this map here, I would like to explain these conventional signs. This indicates a reservoir which has been built on the Missouri River. That is the Fort Peck Reservoir indicated there in black. The red indicates the big dams on the upper Missouri River that are under construction at the present time. The green indicates the one which is still in the planning stage. No construction has been done on that.

FLOOD LARGEST ON RECORD

Mr. Chairman, this year I said that we had an unprecedented flood. This flood this year was some 30 percent larger than any flood that has ever been recorded on the upper Missouri. It is the largest flood that the white man has ever seen. And, in my opinion, it is larger than anything that the Indians saw out there.

Senator ELLENDER. General, would you be able to point out to us from your observation the area from which all of this water came?

General PICK. I will do that, sir.

Mr. Chairman, this flood was caused by the rapid melting of snow. The conditions were ideal for a quick runoff. The ground was hard frozen, and there was a tremendous snow cover on a large part of the upper Missouri Basin.

The snow cover this year was not nearly as large as the snow cover out there in 1949. God knows what would have happened if we had had a thaw in 1949 like we had this year, because the water content up there was some 8 or 10 times greater than it was this year.

We have a problem in the Missouri Basin but that problem can be handled.

Chairman MCKELLAR. Is any part of that area in Canada?

General PICK. Yes. There is a portion of it extending up into Canada. This black line crossing here indicates that this much of the Missouri River Basin drainage area is in Canada.

On the map here I have shown the concentrated snow cover area. All of this area indicated in yellow on the map, is the area where there was a snow cover, a snow blanket in which the moisture content amounted to from 2 to 4 inches of runoff. That is, if it had melted you would have had a runoff of from 2 to 4 inches.

In the green area here, we find that the runoff was equivalent to from 4 to 6 inches; and in the red area here, this small area, we find that the runoff was over 6 inches.

RAPID MELTING OF MOUNTAIN SNOWS

What caused this thaw? Up in this part of the Missouri Basin they have what are known out there as Chinook winds, a warm wind which will blow day and night. When that happens there is a rapid melting of snow.

That happened this year out there. I told you that the ground was all hard frozen. Therefore, when the rapid melting of the snow came, none of that water was allowed to soak into the ground; it ran off immediately. In all of the streams, the Missouri River and all of the tributaries out there, at that time, there was still ice cover on the streams. That amounted to from a few inches on the smaller branches and creeks up to as much as 4 feet on the Missouri River. All of the streams were covered with ice.

When this water started to run off as a result of the melting of the snow, it came down these small streams, breaking up that ice as it went and pusshing it out ahead of it, causing ice jams in the creeks, the larger creeks, the small rivers, and the larger rivers and on down into Missouri. That condition continued building up. Every time you have an ice jam you hold back water. You are saving it and you are getting it all together.

ICE JAMS

When the flood began to get into the Missouri River, a great ice jam occurred in the vicinity of Williston, N. Dak., which is just downstream from the mouth of the Yellowstone River. There a big ice jam occurred, and that had the tendency of holding back all of the water coming out of all of the tributaries up there and getting it all together.

That ice jam finally broke because of the pressure of the water. It came on downstream to Bismarck, N. Dak., where another great ice jam occurred. That picked up all of the water from the tributaries below the Yellowstone and it all got together.

When that ice jam broke there, we knew we had a flood in the Missouri River. We knew that the volume of water behind that ice jam was tremendous. We came downstream below that a little ways into South Dakota and into Mobridge and we measured the discharge there. We found that it was over 400,000 second-feet, something new in the history of the Missouri Basin, the Upper Missouri Basin. We knew then that we were in for a flood.

WEATHER BUREAU FLOOD PREDICTIONS

The Weather Bureau man then began to predict flood heights downstream at Pierre, S. Dak. His prediction was 2 feet higher than the greatest flood of record out there which was in 1881. Down at Sioux City it was the same thing—2½ feet higher than any flood that had ever happened. In Omaha he had it 5 feet higher, 6 feet higher, 7 feet higher, than any flood. We knew then that we had a tremendous catastrophe in the making.

Mr. Chairman, as that flood came down the river, this map indicates what happened. All of the way from the Yellowstone—the Yellowstone is right there [indicating]—all of the way from there to Omaha we had the greatest flood that the white man has ever seen in the upper Missouri Basin. We found that that flood would have been 2 feet higher in Omaha if the Fort Peck Dam, which is here, had not been in operation and had not been holding back a tremendous discharge from the upper part of the Missouri River. That dam there was impounding water at the rate of 86,000 feet per second at one time. If that water had gotten into the river and had gotten in here behind this ice jam and gone on down to Omaha, the gage height there would have been 2 feet higher than it was.

FORT PECK RESERVOIR DISCHARGE

You will notice that below Fort Peck, from here down to the mouth of the Yellowstone, there was no flooding because the discharge from Fort Peck Reservoir was that which was only necessary to turn the hydro turbines there to develop electricity. That is, 4,000 to 5,000 second-feet.

Statements have been made for the record and have been put into the newspapers that the discharge from Fort Peck caused all of this damage done here. Mr. Chairman, the statements are not correct. During this time when this flood was running only sufficient water to keep those turbines running was discharged there, and the rest of it was all impounded in Fort Peck Reservoir where it is now.

Mr. Chairman, statements have been made that this flood was caused by two great ice jams this year. I will cover that a little later.

COUNCIL BLUFFS-OMAHA-KANSAS CITY AREA

You will notice that when you get down to Omaha, you see just one little thin line connecting this flood area here with the flood area down here. Mr. Chairman, this was the way it was at Omaha when I was out there. That area from Omaha down to Kansas City would be much wider if we had had time to get the actual area which had been flooded here above Kansas City and put it on here. This is correct from here on up, because it is from bluff to bluff from Omaha upstream past Pierre and into the Dakotas. I saw that. It couldn't have been any higher because it was from bluff to bluff.

I was calling attention to this narrow bottleneck here at Omaha. On this side of the river, this is the bluff line along here, along there, down around here, and back to high ground here. Here we have a levee and a flood wall which protects all of this industrial section of Omaha.

LEVEES

On the other side of the river we have a levee which comes down here like this, then comes around and goes back to high ground here which protects Council Bluffs, Iowa. At this point here, between Council Bluffs and Omaha, the distance is not what it is up here along in this area from Sioux City down to Omaha in this area. The distance between the bluffs averages 7 or 8 miles there. The narrower

sections are from 4 to 4½ miles in width, and the wider sections are 17 miles wide. At Omaha, the distance between levees and the distance between high ground on each side of the river is just 1,200 feet.

FLOOD CHANNEL

So all of this flood had to go through that bottleneck. We foresaw that when we were designing the works at Omaha and Council Bluffs. We designed them to take care of a flood which was 3 feet higher than any flood which had ever been experienced here, and then we added 5 feet of free board on the works there in order to take care of this bottleneck area.

The elevation of these levees through here at Omaha and Council Bluffs is 31.5. The Weather Bureau, which is responsible for predicting flood heights, estimated that this flood that has just passed Omaha would reach 31.5.

Mr. Chairman, up in this area here where the distance across from bluff to bluff is several miles and where you are approaching the bottleneck area, we experienced over 32 feet on these levees. But the week before the flood crest got down, using emergency authorities which the Congress has provided to the Corps of Engineers, I directed that every effort be made to strengthen and raise these levees through here to take care of this flood. That was done through the most terrific flood fight that I have ever had anything to do with. Everybody, the local people, the local civic bodies, the State officials, the Government officials, Government organizations, the National Guard, troops of the United States Army, troops of the Air Force, and everybody formed one of the greatest flood-fighting teams that I ever saw in my life and succeeded in holding these levees. They were raised from 2½ to 3½ feet in some places and even 4 feet, and the levees held.

Mr. Chairman, if those levees had not held on both sides of the river there, I would like to show you what we would have had there. We would have had this area covered by flood, whereas all of this area on the Omaha side and all of this area from here back on the other side of the river in Council Bluffs was protected. In other words, we would have had another Kansas City catastrophe like we had last year. Millions and millions of dollars worth of industrial development back of these levees have been protected. If we had not had the emergency authority available for this flood fighting, God knows how we would have done it.

PEOPLE DISPLACED BY FLOOD

Mr. Chairman, I would like to call your attention to this chart. You will notice here that the Missouri River flood blocked 38 railroads in that area which were flooded. It disrupted 106 main highways. It displaced 96,200 people. Those people were moved out.

Mr. Chairman, this is something new. This is a new experience that we have had in this flood this year. With all of those people moved out and with all of this great area flooded, I am happy to report that I do not know of a single loss of life which, in my opinion, can be attributed directly to the plans and the foresight exercised by the Government agencies and the people in the area in moving these people out prior to the time that the floodwaters reached there.

TOWNS AND CITIES FLOODED

There were 102 towns and cities inundated to a greater or lesser extent. There were 2,400,000 acres of land in the valley inundated.

Chairman McKellar. General, do you recall in a general way about how long that land was inundated? About how long were the 2,400,000 acres of land inundated?

General Pick. I would say that it would run pretty close to 10 days. I think it would be even more, 2 weeks or more. For instance, in the great lake area here from Omaha up, I would say that the maximum area up there was inundated for at least 10 days.

Senator Ellender. Some of that acreage is still inundated.

General Pick. Yes. A large percentage of it, sir, was inundated for 2 weeks or more.

Now, there were many levee lines along this river.

Chairman McKellar. Just one moment, if you do not mind an interruption.

General Pick. Yes, sir?

Chairman McKellar. The greater part of those people who were displaced came from that flooded farm area, did they not?

General Pick. Yes, sir. This valley down here, this valley from Sioux City and Yankton on down is thickly populated. It is really surprising the number of people living in that flood plain. It is highly developed farm land, sir, the richest farm land you can find anywhere in the valley and is thickly populated. They have built private levees all up and down there, and in this spot we had 270 of those levees breached. Of course, they were all breached or overtopped.

TOTAL DAMAGE

We have not been able to make up a damage list that is complete. Our present estimate is that the damages will certainly amount to $300 million.

FLOOD PROTECTION BY LEVEE SYSTEM

Mr. Chairman, if the Omaha and Council Bluffs levees had not held, and if the other Federal works that have been built under the present comprehensive plan had not been built out there, the damages would have been tremendous. Those levees that we have built out there protected in the neighborhood of $1 billion worth of development in the urban and city areas.

In other words, the building of those levees at Kansas City and at Omaha has saved property values running into the hundreds of millions of dollars.

AGRICULTURAL LEVEES

Down in this area, Mr. Chairman, where is shown the black lines, we had some agricultural levees on both sides of the river. There are seven or eight units that have been constructed.

Chairman McKellar. What do you mean by agricultural levees? Were they built by the Agriculture Department?

General Pick. No, sir. They are levees that were built under this plan by the Corps of Engineers protecting primarily agricultural lands.

This flood was so great that we lost three of those by having the levees overtopped by this flood. That overtopping of about 150,000 acres of land behind these three levees took the top off of the crest there and allowed us to hold the remainder of the levees in this section of the river which is below Omaha and above Leavenworth, Kans.

### DAMAGES PREVENTED

Now, the works that we had out there in those areas, we think, prevented damages amounting to somewhere in the neighborhood of $163 million.

Chairman McKellar. But outside of that, there were some $300 million of damage done?

General Pick. Yes, sir. And the figure will probably run higher than that.

Senator McClellan. General, would you mind stating at this point what would have been the result if all of your protective works in the comprehensive plan had been built?

General Pick. I am going to cover that, sir.

Mr. Chairman, by means of this little chart here, I want to give you some idea as to what this flood was that we were working with. This green bar on the chart indicates the flood of 1881. The red bar indicates the flood of 1943 which was the second largest flood of record in the upper Missouri. The 1881 flood was the largest flood of record up to that time.

Over here, we have Pierre, S. Dak.; Sioux City, Iowa; and Omaha, Nebr., coming downstream in that order.

### COMPARISON WITH PRIOR FLOODS

The discharge in the 1881 flood at Pierre, S. Dak., which was the biggest flood up to that time, was 259,000 second-feet. In the 1943 flood the discharge at Pierre, S. Dak., was 281,000 second-feet. In the flood of this year, 1952, the discharge was 428,000 second-feet.

At Sioux City, the 1881 flood was a tremendously big flood, with a discharge of 362,000 second-feet. In the case of the 1943 flood at Sioux City the discharge was 200,000 second-feet. And in the case of the flood of this year at Sioux City, the discharge was 460,000 second-feet, almost 30 percent greater than the 1881 flood.

Coming down to Omaha, in the 1881 flood, the discharge there was 370,000 second-feet. The discharge in the 1943 flood was 200,000 second-feet, and the discharge in 1952 was 410,000 second-feet, in other words, twice as much as the flood of 1943 there.

### WATER HELD IN FORT PECK RESERVOIR

In the case of the flood of this year, I call your attention to the fact that we were holding back enough water to raise the gage at Omaha 2 feet. That water was being held in the Fort Peck Reservoir. You can see that the works which had been designed to protect these areas here were works not designed to take care of any flood like we had experienced this year. It was only the special treatment of the bottleneck at Omaha which got the levee lines there high enough to protect against this year's flood that saved the situation.

UNCOMPLETED FLOOD DAMS

To answer Senator McClellan's question, Mr. Chairman, Fort Peck Dam up here is completed and is in operation. This dam here [Garrison] is being worked on. This dam at Pierre, S. Dak. [Oahe], is being worked on. This dam at Fort Randall in South Dakota is being worked on, and we are just starting the Gavins Point Dam.

If those dams had been completed and in operation, the flood here this year, at these three important points along the river, would have been represented by this red line across here. Instead of the discharge at Pierre being 428,000 second-feet, it would have been 70,000 second-feet. And instead of the discharge being 460,000 second-feet at Sioux City, it would have been 100,000 second-feet. Instead of the discharge being 410,000 second-feet at Omaha, it would have been 110,000 second-feet.

In other words, if these dams had been completed—and they could have been completed by this time from a construction standpoint—this flood would not have done any damage in the upper Missouri Basin this year.

Chairman McKellar. General, I recall being very much struck by your statement with reference to Tuttle Creek Dam. Is that dam involved in this situation?

General Pick. No, sir. The Tuttle Creek Dam is over here on the Kansas River.

Chairman McKellar. Is that down further?

General Pick. It is on the Kansas River and is independent and separate from any consideration of these dams up here.

Chairman McKellar. Did the House make any appropriation for that?

General Pick. The House did not make any appropriations for the Tuttle Creek Dam, although it is included in the budget.

Mr. Chairman, I think that we saw this year the greatest flood that the upper Missouri Basin ever saw. I think we have seen the last great flood in the upper Missouri Basin, because we have reached the point now where we can begin to derive benefits from the funds which the Congress has appropriated and which we have put to use.

CONSTRUCTION COMPLETION DATE

In July of this year, we will close the Fort Randall Dam, and next year it will be available to start controlling floods on the upper Missouri. If we go ahead with our present program as we have planned it and get the funds that we have in the bill this year for Garrison Dam, we expect to close that dam next year.

If those two dams had been closed this year, that would have cut the damage from this flood down tremendously.

If we go ahead and prosecute this program on the upper Missouri diligently, we can eliminate from now on the devastating floods on the upper Missouri River and put that water to work for the people for the benefit of the community and the Nation.

Senator Ellender. General, to what extent did the recent flood affect the construction that is now in progress at the Garrison and Fort Randall Dams that you have just mentioned?

General PICK. Senator, believe it or not, these dams are earth dams, and, of course, we left the whole width of the river there open to be filled in when we closed the dams. Yet, a terrific amount of water passed between those two ends of those two earth dams, and the compaction that we got in those two dams was so great that they were not damaged.

Senator ELLENDER. No earth was taken away?

General PICK. Not to any degree. It is the most surprising thing to me. They tell me that we have suffered no appreciable damage at those two points. I am glad to report that to the committee. I inquired several times about what effect the flood had on those two dams, and they tell me that it did not have any appreciable amount. We didn't experience an appreciable amount of damage there at all.

RESTORATION REQUESTED

Chairman MCKELLAR. Tell me what plan you have in connection with those two dams in the present bill. Are you going to increase them or enlarge them in any way, or what is the proposal?

Senator ELLENDER. You mean, Fort Randall and Garrison?

General PICK. Yes. We think that the budget estimate on those two structures should be restored.

Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to decide now to go ahead and build this one and complete this chain of reservoirs so that we will never have any more disturbance from floods in the lower river.

OAHE DAM, S. DAK.

Chairman MCKELLAR. You say "this one." Which one do you mean?

General PICK. The Oahe Dam at Pierre, S. Dak.

Senator ELLENDER. How much did the House allow for that?

General PICK. Only $700,000.

Chairman MCKELLAR. How much was the budget estimate?

BUDGET ESTIMATE

General PICK. The budget estimate was $3,500,000.

Mr. Chairman, the snow cover which I showed you, if we go back to 1949, would have been centered here and down in Nebraska here, you see. In other words, it would have been centered below the Garrison Dam. In 1949, it was generally centered below there. There was 5 feet of snow on the level all through South Dakota here; and if we had had a chinook wind out there that year, this one dam here would not have been anywhere large enough to take off the top of a thaw such as that.

Senator ELLENDER. General, you said that Big Bend Dam has not been started. Has the Budget Bureau given any estimate as to what should be appropriated this year?

General PICK. No, sir. We have not selected that for construction as yet, because we felt that these main structures should be completed first because there is very little flood control in Big Bend.

Senator ELLENDER. That was going to be my next question.

General PICK. There is very little flood control there. It is primarily a power project and a very fine power project. We are concentrating on these flood-control dams first.

FORT RANDALL DAM, S. DAK.

Senator ELLENDER. How much work has been done on Fort Randall? What percentage of the work has been completed, if you know?

General PICK. About 60 to 65 percent of the work has been done already. We expect to close it in July or rather to start the closing of it in July. So you can see that we are on the downgrade side.

Senator ELLENDER. That is true, provided the Congress appropriates the budget estimate?

General PICK. That is right, sir.

Senator ELLENDER. And you will need the entire budget estimate?

General PICK. Yes, sir.

Senator ELLENDER. In order to be able to close it?

General PICK. Yes, sir. You cannot extend yourself when you are closing a dam.

Senator ELLENDER. And the same thing applies to Garrison?

General PICK. Yes; the same thing applies there.

GAVINS POINT DAM, S. DAK.

Senator ELLENDER. How about Gavins Point?

General PICK. We ought to go ahead with that just as fast as we can because that is the dam that is to regulate the release of all of the water that we store up there.

Senator ELLENDER. What percentage of that dam has been completed?

General PICK. We have just started that.

Senator ELLENDER. You started that this spring?

General PICK. Yes.

Senator ELLENDER. How much did you ask for that, General?

General PICK. $13 million.

Senator ELLENDER. And how much was allowed by the House?

General PICK. Nothing.

Senator ELLENDER. Nothing at all?

General PICK. That is right, sir.

SENTIMENT OF PEOPLE

Mr. Chairman, there is just one thing that I want to call your attention to, and that is the sentiment of the people in the Missouri Basin at this time.

Everybody that I have talked to, all of the newspapers that I have seen—and I have seen a lot of them—and the large number of letters and telegrams that I have received from the people out there, in my opinion, indicate that the people out there want these floods controlled. The most pathetic sight that I ever have seen in my life was the flooding from Sioux City downstream to Council Bluffs where, on every section of land, there will average about two farms.

Senator BUTLER. More than that, General.

General PICK. It is just as thickly populated as it can be.

Mr. Chairman, I don't think a flood brings anybody any good. I am positive that those people whose land was inundated out there this year, like the people in the Kansas River Basin last year, will not recover for years to come. Their losses have been losses that cannot be recovered in any way, shape, form, or fashion. They have to stand them themselves. I am positive that the Federal Government has lost a lot of revenue this year out there in that the damages that those people have suffered are going to be so great that there will be no income tax paid by anybody whose land was inundated out there as they are really ruined with the water having come up to the roofs of the houses—and I saw that with my own eyes.

Senator ELLENDER. General, as the result of this tremendous flood, have you been able to determine whether or not any changes will have to be made in the plans that you have prepared for this area?

General PICK. Mr. Chairman, I would not change one thing that we are going to do in this upper river area. I would not change one thing in the lay-out of the levees at Omaha. I would not change one thing in the lay-out of the levees protecting the agricultural land.

Senator ELLENDER. Does it indicate whether or not any errors were made as to the heights that you should build these levees to?

General PICK. No, sir.

Senator ELLENDER. It is all within your estimates?

General PICK. Yes, sir. We have built the levees high enough because all of these levees down here are built to operate in conjunction with these dams up here. We cannot afford to build them any higher down there because we must economize every way that we can and these things must be treated as a unit and must be operated as a unit. We could not build agricultural levees down here to carry floods like this.

Chairman MCKELLAR. It will be a very serious loss to the American people if these dams are not constructed as planned?

General PICK. Yes, sir. We have factual evidence to substantiate that opinion.

Chairman MCKELLAR. And the budget estimate has been sent in for them?

General PICK. Yes, sir.

### TOTAL 1953 CIVIL FUNCTIONS BUDGET

Senator MCCLELLAN. General, what is the amount of the budget estimate this year for all of the projects that you have been discussing this morning? What is the total amount in the budget?

General PICK. The budget estimate was $117 million for the Missouri River Basin projects and that amount was reduced to $71 million in the House bill.

### HOUSE CUT

Senator MCCLELLAN. And that is what I wanted to get. The House has reduced it by $46 million?

General PICK. Yes, sir, $46 million in round numbers.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Do you think you will need every dollar of that amount restored if you are going to do this job?

General PICK. Yes, sir. That was carefully worked out.

Senator McCLELLAN. Can the work be carried on economically with the funds that the House allowed?

General PICK. No, sir, I do not consider that it could be.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, it will be definitely false economy to retard the work and the progress would be handicapped by such a sharp reduction in funds?

General PICK. That is correct, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. If the full amount is restored, the work can be carried on and progress made in an orderly, systematic, advantageous fashion?

General PICK. Yes, sir. That is the way we are planning to do it. If the funds are cut, the plan has to be changed and time element extended. I do not think it will promote economy.

Senator McCLELLAN. Do you not get better results where you are given enough money to go ahead and do a job as it is engineeringly feasible and in the quickest possible way?

General PICK. Yes, sir, that is the way to obtain the greatest amount of economy.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BUTLER

Senator BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, would you permit a word from a nonmember of the committee at this point?

Chairman McKELLAR. Yes, sir.

Senator BUTLER. I am something of an engineer myself. I was one at one time. I am an ex-engineer now.

The one lesson that an engineer learns early in his career is that when money is appropriated in private industry and private construction, let us say it is a $10 million building for rental, the people who are putting up that money want that $10 million expended at the earliest time and at the fastest rate possible to get the job done so as to begin getting returns on the investment.

It is awfully difficult, of course, for us in the Congress and for the Government agencies perhaps to have that same rule adopted when we are spending Federal money for the completion of plans like this. But the logic is exactly the same for the construction of public projects as it is in the construction of private projects.

I do not know how you could estimate the income loss to the Federal Government this year from this particular flood; but I am positive in my own mind that it exceeds the total budget estimate for this year. I mean that the immediate loss this year in income to the Treasury Department from that area will be more than is asked for to do this full job for the coming year.

Senator McCLELLAN. You mean in revenues?

Senator BUTLER. They have asked for the restoration of $46 million.

Chairman McKELLAR. That is a very interesting statement. Can you furnish a little more accurate data?

Senator BUTLER. I will try to do that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman McKELLAR. I hope you will and that you will put it in the record.

Senator BUTLER. Thank you.

(The statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT BY SENATOR HUGH BUTLER, REGARDING LOSS OF REVENUE TO THE TREASURY AS A RESULT OF FLOOD DAMAGE IN THE MISSOURI BASIN IN 1952

A conservative estimate of the direct, immediate loss to the Treasury of revenue as a result of losses to taxpayers caused by the 1952 flood in the Missouri Basin indicates that the revenue loss will amount to between $50 million and $100 million. This estimate takes no account of indirect losses to the Treasury as a result of decreased earnings during the years ahead, etc.

In computing these figures, it must be realized that the United States Treasury is, in effect, a major stockholder in every business corporation, and in the business earnings and personal incomes of every family and wage earner in the United States today. On the average, the Federal Government's share in the earnings of a corporation is greater than the share left to corporate management for corporate purposes and dividend payments. Te Rederal Treasury also receives an important percentage of the income of every individual. Any loss in business profits or personal income of any individual or corporation in the country, therefore, is immediately and directly reflected in Treasury receipts.

Furthermore, it must be recalled that flood damage to physical assets—whether business or personal—is deductible from income and it may be carried over for as much as 5 years as a deduction against future income. Any individual or corporation, therefore, which has suffered destruction of valuable physical assets will not doubt deduct these losses against income during the coming years (up to 5) until the entire loss is accounted for. The revenue loss resulting to the Treasury from this flood may, therefore, be felt for several years.

To illustrate this point, assume a corporation having annual earnings of approximately $100,000, and suffering a flood loss of $500,000. Such a corporation will be permitted under present tax laws to deduct $100,000 of its flood loss against income for the next 5 years. The Treasury will lose all corporate income-tax revenue for a 5-year period from a corporation in such circumstances.

In other words, substantially the entire loss from this flood estimated at $300 million will be reflected in income returns, either as a loss of income this years, or as a deduction from income during this and succeeding years.

In computing the extent of the loss to the Treasury, it seems reasonable and conservative to assume that at least 25 percent of this loss will be borne by the Treasury through decreased income-tax receipts—individual or corporate. In selecting this 25-percent figure, it should be recalled that the marginal tax rate (including excess-profits tax) of the average corporation today is approximately 60 percent. The marginal tax rate of the average individual income-tax return is probably about 25 percent, which is the marginal rate for married taxpayers in the $4,000-to-$8,000-tax bracket. I have used the more conservative of these two figures—25 percent—25 percent of the $300 million loss gives a figure of $75 million, representing direct, immediate loss in tax revenue to the Treasury.

No attempt has been made to compute indirect losses in revenue as a result of loss of income during the period of flood, cost of evacuation and return, loss of earnings during the coming years from the destruction of income-producing assets, and indirect business losses to businesses of the are dependent upon the income and productivity of the area for their trade or raw materials.

Reductions by the House of Representatives in budget requests for the four main-stem Missouri dams (Garrison, Oahe, Fort Randall, and Gavins Point) aggregate $27,300,000. Analysis of the 1952 flood has demonstrated that completion of these dams would have completely prevented any flood damage in the bottoms along the main stem of the Missouri. Completion of these dams at the earliest possible moment will be much less expensive than permitting destructive floods to continue. It will be less expensive not only to the people of the area, but to the Treasury itself in terms of dollars and cents.

As a major shareholder in the income from such areas as this one, the United States Government has a financial interest in preserving its revenue by investing funds necessary to protect these revenue-producing assets. The United States Government cannot afford to permit this income to be washed away.

KANSAS CITY PROTECTED BY FLOOD WORKS

General PICK. Mr. Chairman, that completes the general briefing except that I would like to say that this flood passed on down the Missouri River to Kansas City where we had the works that were destroyed last year reestablished. This flood passed by Kansas City without creating any damage because we had adequate protection to take care of it.

CHANGES IN MISSOURI RIVER CHANNEL

I would like to say that there is some wild river between Omaha and Sioux City. The river has started meandering around up there.

There was some evidence that perhaps it had left the channel in some places and had created new channels. We have not been able to determine as yet whether the river has cut new channels in the area and left the old channels for good or whether it will return to the old channels.

The point I am making is that we have to give serious consideration to confining this river back to the channel. We think it ought to be reconfined to its channel that was established for it.

Senator BUTLER. There would not be much use, however, in constructing levees until you get your dams built?

General PICK. We cannot construct the levees up there until we get the dams in, but then we must tie this river down here and hold it in place because it will always meander if it is allowed to shift around without any restriction.

Chairman MCKELLAR. Are there any other questions, gentlemen?

General, we are very much obliged to you for your very fine exposition.

General PICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCKELLAR. Who is the next witness?

General PICK. Mr. Chairman, my staff is here and we are ready to proceed with the hearings on the appropriations bill in any manner or any order which you care to take up.

Chairman MCKELLAR. I have taken the matter up with a number of people down in my section who want to appear. They will let me know in a day or so, and then I will let Mr. Smith know. We will call you and call the members of the committee for a meeting at the very first opportunity. We want to get this thing through as soon as possible.

General PICK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add one thing to my statement, if I may.

Chairman MCKELLAR. Yes, indeed.

ICE JAMS

General PICK. I would like to add this. You will recall that I pointed out that there was a big ice jam up here next to Williston, N. Dak., and another one down at Bismarck. The rumor is going around that ice jams caused this flood this year, and I agree with that. But the rumor has it that the ice jams caused the flood and that it would not have made any difference how many of these dams we had built they would not have relieved the situation any because these floods were caused by ice jams. In other words, that is putting out erroneous

information to the effect that you can have a flood in the Missouri River caused by ice jams, a flood that would not be eliminated or prevented by these dams if they had been built.

Senator ELLENDER. Well, General, you can safely say that if the ice jams had held for a little while longer, the flood would not have been as bad as it was?

General PICK. Yes, sir; but they could not have been expected to hold.

Senator ELLENDER. Certainly. So that in lieu of the ice jams if you had had those dams—that you are trying to build—already constructed, the flood would not have occurred?

General PICK. You see, if we had had Garrison built, the first ice jam which occurred up here would not have occurred at all because that water would have been caught in Garrison Reservoir. And if all of that ice would have been caught in Garrison Reservoir, you would not have had an ice jam 75 miles downstream from the Garrison Reservoir.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I do not know why that rumor is going around.

Chairman MCKELLAR. They will go around.

General PICK. They will go around.

Chairman MCKELLAR. I know about that business.

Senator ELLENDER. This is an election year, you know. You are likely to hear any kind of rumor.

Chairman MCKELLAR. General, I wanted to ask you one question. I take it your local engineers agree with you entirely about this matter, your local engineers out there?

General PICK. Our engineers?

Chairman MCKELLAR. Yes, sir.

General PICK. I know of no engineer who disagrees with what we maintain these dams will do.

Chairman MCKELLAR. And that is the proper way to handle it?

General PICK. I am positive that is the proper way to handle it.

Chairman MCKELLAR. All right, sir.

Are there any other questions? Senator, do you have any other questions?

Senator ELLENDER. No, sir.

### COMMITTEE HEARING PROCEDURE

Chairman MCKELLAR. Well, I do not think we ought to start on this now, General. About Monday, probably, would be as early as I can get my folks up here. They want to come from Nashville and they want to come from Memphis. I do not know whether you have anybody coming from Louisiana or not, but they are welcome to come.

Senator ELLENDER. Some of them have already come in.

Chairman MCKELLAR. I will arrange an understanding with Mr. Smith to call the committee together when we are ready to start again.

Senator ELLENDER. General, I wonder whether it would be your desire, following your general statement, to be a little more specific as to each dam.

General PICK. We will be prepared to give detailed testimony on each item.

Senator ELLENDER. Would you want to do that? You do think it is necessary, do you not?

General PICK. I do not know whether it is necessary or not, sir. That has been put in the record many times. There was a record made in the House on that subject about 2 inches thick and we have submitted an appeal to the committee here.

Senator ELLENDER. Let me ask you this: Do you think it is necessary for you to present this committee any more evidence to justify your position that the Senate should restore what the House eliminated?

General PICK. I think we should give detailed information on those items which the House eliminated from the bill.

Senator ELLENDER. That is what I had in mind, particularly with reference to these several dams.

General PICK. I think so.

Senator ELLENDER. Would it be a good idea, while the general has his people here, to give that now?

Chairman MCKELLAR. That will be all right, if the general is ready.

Are you ready to go on with that now?

I think we ought to get along with this bill as rapidly as possible.

General PICK. Yes; we can start.

RESTORATION OF FUNDS

Chairman MCKELLAR. I would like to place in the record at this point an exchange of correspondence with the President of the United States and, without objection, that will be done.

(The letters referred to follow:)

THE WHITE HOUSE,
*Washington, April 25, 1952.*

Hon. KENNETH MCKELLAR,
*Chairman, Appropriations Committee, United States Senate,*
*Washington 25, D. C.*

DEAR KENNETH: On April 2, the House of Representatives passed H. R. 7268, the Army civil functions appropriations bill for the fiscal year 1953. In doing so, the House reduced my budget requests for flood control and river and harbor development by 29 percent. The effect of this reduction would be to stop construction on a number of projects now underway, to slow down work on many others, and to prevent starting certain new projects which I included in the 1953 budget.

Within 10 days after the House action, the false economy of any such move was demonstrated—demonstrated in havoc and destruction by floods on the Missouri River, the upper Mississippi River, and the Red River of the North. The terrible damage that has been done—and is still being done—by floodwaters in the Midwest is inescapable evidence that we must move ahead with water control projects as rapidly as we can afford to in these times of budgetary stringency.

Accordingly, I strongly recommend that your committee and the Senate restore the funds cut out by the House and approve the full amount of the budget recommendations for these purposes.

I appreciate the desire of the Members of the House to hold budget expenditures for civil public works to a minimum at a time when we have to put so much money into national security programs. I had the same thought in mind when I prepared the budget. I deferred or eliminated, in this emergency budget, many projects which would bring clear benefits to the Nation and would be highly desirable in normal times, and I included funds for starting new projects only when they were clearly of such urgency that they could not be deferred.

I firmly believe that to cut below the budget estimates would lose us far more than would be saved. There is no economy in spending less than we can afford on our efforts to stop these disastrous floods.

This is well illustrated by the projects on the upper Missouri. Four dams are under construction there: Garrison in North Dakota, Oahe and Fort Randall in South Dakota, and Gavins Point on South Dakota-Nebraska border. If all four had been finished, they could have caught and held this spring's flood waters and prevented any serious damage along the main stem of the Missouri. And yet the House action would stop work entirely on two of them, and slow down the other two—very possibly delaying for a year the scheduled closure of Garrison Dam, the largest reservoir of them all. Until those dams are finished, the people of the Missouri Basin can have no assurance against a repetition of this spring's disaster. I can see no economy whatever in delaying that time any longer than we have to.

The same thing is true of the other projects in the 1953 budget. Every one of them is thoroughly justified—including projects other than those which will yield primarily flood-control benefits, and projects other than those in the present flood area. The budget contains funds, for example, for starting Ice Harbor Dam in Washington and Hartwell Dam in South Carolina, both of which will yield very badly needed power, and both of which have a close relation to the atomic-energy installation nearby. The budget also contains funds to start Tuttle Creek and Glen Elder Dams in Kansas (the latter being in the Interior Department budget estimates), and for flood-protection work at Topeka, Kans., and Cape Girardeau, Mo.—these being the most important flood-control projects needed in the Kansas-Missouri area where last year's ravaging floods occurred. All these projects are urgently needed, and yet all were entirely cut out by the House.

I think the House action was thoroughly unsound. The proper way to stop flood destruction, and to turn our rivers into sources of benefit instead of destruction, is to move forward steadily, year by year, toward the orderly and economic completion of projects now under way and from time to time to start a few of the most urgent new projects on a highly selective basis. That is exactly the program incorporated in the budget. It would be thrown into wasteful confusion by the House action. These problems cannot be handled efficiently on an intermittent, stop-and-go basis. They need steady, orderly progress, such as the budget provides for.

I should like to take note of one additional point. It was claimed in the House that all new work in the Missouri Basin should be held up until the Missouri Basin Survey Commission, which I established in January, makes its report. No one knows better than I that we need more comprehensive and better balanced planning for future develoment in the Missouri Basin—and in most other areas. That is why I set up the Commission. But, as I indicated when I established the Commission, it provides no excuse whatever for failing to proceed with projects which we now know are sound and beneficial and urgently needed. That is the type of project—and the only type—which I included in the 1953 budget.

We must stop these rampaging floods and this terrible damage to farms and farm buildings, to homes and business districts in towns and cities. Last week, I visited the flooded areas along the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. Last year I visted the flooded areas in Missouri, Kansas, and Oklahoma. In previous years I have seen the floods in the Pacific Northwest and the Red River of the North and other areas. They have all been terrible. They have caused terrific economic losses and human suffering. They must be stopped. And we know how to stop them.

I wish every Member of Congress could see these flooded areas and walk through the devastation that floods leave behind. I don't think there would be any question then about approving the budget recommendations for controlling the waters in our great rivers and using them for good instead of letting them go on a rampage.

I believe the budget for these projects is just as tight as it can properly be made. I believe it would be wasteful, instead of economical, to appropriate less. I hope your committee and the Congress will restore the funds for flood control and related work that the House cut out.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

APRIL 28, 1952.

The PRESIDENT,
*The White House, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Your letter of the 25th about appropriations for the Mississippi, Missouri, and other western streams, received and noted.

As you know, I am 100 percent with you on these western streams as I have always been. There might be some compromises on other items but not on these. These are "musts," in your own strong language.

I have directed Mr. Smith, clerk of the committee, to call a meeting as soon as possible. I can see no reason why we cannot win but you know how such things are. It takes work and I know you will help in every way. I have already been busy on this for several days.

Thanking you for your letter and with much respect, I am

Sincerely your friend,

KENNETH MCKELLAR.

(Whereupon, at 11:50 a. m., Wednesday, April 30, 1952, the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the chairman.)